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AirDate: March 10, 2010

To Listen 24/7 Go To: http://www.talkshoe.com/tc/19487 

Episode 146 

HOST: Bob Calvert

GUEST:

USA Colonel Jeffrey Jarkowsky
DIVISION CHIEF, J-3, 7
JOINT IED DEFEAT ORGANIZATION

www.jieddo.dod.mil 

Colonel Jeffrey Jarkowsky, a resident of New Jersey, graduated from St. Peters College and was commissioned in the U.S. Army as an infantry officer.

He is currently assigned as the J-3, 7 Operations and Training Division Chief of the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization in Arlington, Virginia.

His previous assignment was as Commander of Combined Joint Task Force Paladin USFOR-Afghanistan during OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM (2008-2009).

Colonel Jarkowsky has served in a series of duty positions throughout his career, from Platoon Leader to Theater Army chief of Staff.  From his start as a platoon leader in the 1st Battalion, 9th Infantry Regiment in Korea, Colonel Jarkowsky has commanded at every level from rifle companies in 506th Infantry and 75th Ranger Regiment, through Battalion Level with the 509th Parachute Infantry Battalion and at Brigade Level with the 196th Infantry Brigade and most recently as the CIED CJTF Commander in Afghanistan. 

Colonel Jarkowsky has likewise served in numerous Operations and Plans Staff assignments at the Battalion, Brigade, Division, Corps, Theater Army, and COCOM Levels.

Colonel Jarkowsky earned a masters degree in Strategy from the U.S. Army War College and in Military History from the CGSC.

He is a graduate of the Army's Command and General Staff and War Colleges.

The Threat
Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) are the weapon of choice for terrorists worldwide, requiring limited skills and giving them the ability to conduct spectacular attacks for a relatively small investment.

Terrorists, from insurgent groups to anarchists, have discovered that the public relations benefit of explosive attacks far outweigh those of attacks using more conventional weapons. With easy access to commercial technologies, training via the Internet, and the ability to either manufacture or otherwise procure explosive materials, IEDs continued to provide the enemy with inexpensive, stand-off, precision weapon systems that often provide the attacker with near total anonymity.

In Iraq, the use of IEDs has steadily declined since the summer of 2007, today reaching their lowest levels since October 2003. The decline is attributed to a number of factors including: counter-IED (C-IED) efforts, the coalition "surge" operation, a more capable and confident Iraqi Security Force apparatus, Muqtada al Sadr's cease-fire order to the main Shi'a insurgent groups, and the Sunni awakening movement known popularly as the "Sons of Iraq."

These factors converged to create a more stable operational environment where coalition and Iraqi Forces concentrated their collective efforts on eliminating al Qaeda in Iraq as a threat to an enduring and stable Iraq.

In Afghanistan, coalition forces face a much different battle space than in Iraq. Here, the threat is not sectarian in nature, but more of a traditional insurgent battle where the enemy uses IEDs as one of many weapons in its arsenal.

The use of IEDs in Afghanistan has dramatically increased, steadily climbing since 2005. They tend to be less sophisticated than those found in Iraq. They are used more as an initiator for complex attacks involving small unit ambush tactics and conventional weapons. Taliban, Taliban-affiliated warlords, and al Qaeda fighters continue to use IEDs to discredit coalition forces and the central government as a means to control terrain and the populace.

IEDs will continue to threaten security forces throughout the world, growing in sophistication and frequency as more enemies of peace share information and realize the potential psychological, social, and political impact of this weapon. No other widely available terror weapon has more potential for mass media attention and strategic influence as does the IED.

History of JIEDDO
Faced with the escalating use of IEDs in Iraq and Afghanistan, the office of the Army Chief of Staff established the Army IED Task Force in October 2003. The task force reached out to Army components, its sister services, the private sector and academia to improve threat-intelligence gathering, acquire C-IED technologies and develop C-IED training.

The early success of the Army IED Task Force, which saw a reduction in casualty rates per IED attack despite an increased in-theater use of the devices over its period of operation, led then Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul D. Wolfowitz to transform the entity into a Joint IED Task Force.

Reporting directly to the Deputy Secretary, the joint program was able to leverage the experience and expertise of warfighters across the services, enhance its network attack focus, increase the procurement of device defeat tools and build a robust set of IED-specific force training operations.

With DoD Directive 2000.19E in February 2006,  the  joint  task  force was
converted into a permanently-manned entity: the Joint IED Defeat Organization. Given the role and resources to comprehensively attack and defeat the IED threat, the organization has grown to support a broad spectrum of C-IED initiatives, tools and programs with a staff comprised of military, government civilians and contractors.

Organizational Structure
In 2008, JIEDDO reviewed and revised its internal organization, which was motivated by several considerations. The organization needed to be structured for an enduring effort. Management oversight of JIEDDO-funded initiatives and internal controls required the efforts of government staff dedicated to these functions.

The organizational design of JIEDDO needed to be easily recognized and leveraged by our external customers and stakeholders. As depicted below, JIEDDO's functional staff is aligned with the joint staff construct of DoD.

To get ahead of rapid threat IED development, JIEDDO created the Competitive Strategies Group (CSG) in FY 2008. The CSG seeks to develop and provide JIEDDO with a continuous competitive advantage in the C-IED fight by anticipating second and third order effects of adversary adaptation in the use of IEDs in order to defeat IEDs as weapons of strategic influence.

The Acquisition Oversight Division (AOD) was established the same year to improve program management oversight for C-IED initiatives across all phases of the Joint IED Defeat Capability Approval and Acquisition Management Process (JCAAMP), including oversight of cost, schedule, performance, and test activities. AOD's efforts to facilitate transitions and transfers (T2) of C-IED initiatives to the services have resulted in enhanced transparency of T2 activities, closer coordination with the services, and better synchronization with established DoD organizations and processes.

JIEDDO has also established an Internal Review Office as an independent
assurance and consulting activity designed to: standardize and monitor internal controls for financial management, assist in developing policy for managing information technology, define and monitor management roles and responsibilities of JIEDDO's component organizations, and improve standardization of JIEDDO's process for publishing Broad Area Announcements (BAAs).

For All Media Requests, contact JIEDDO at:
703-601-3784

www.jieddo.dod.mil